Simulation and global crises

posted by on 2010.03.30, under Programming, Theory

Prior to the 1980’s it was not obvious that computer simulation would drive architectural change. As Sherry Turkle explains in Simulation and its Discontents, this was a time of batch processing before the development of the immersive environment of computer simulation. Simulation and its Discontents follows the introduction of computer simulation at MIT, exposing the still present tension surrounding our understanding, control and seduction by simulation. Those early debates at MIT seem to foreshadow our current situation; a period where the two major events – the global financial crisis and global warming – exist in, and as a result of, simulation. A situation that was not obvious prior to the 1980’s.

Reading Simulation and its Discontents, the global financial crisis appears to be caused by economists “drunk with code.” A large part of the cause (although I am no economist, and even economists disagree on this) seems to be the ‘black-boxing’ of assets into mortgage backed securities. These securities are a way to collectively value to highly risky assets, however hidden inside them is assumptions regarding the default rate on mortgages. Architecture was black-boxed in a similar way during the introduction of simulation. Engineering equations were hidden behind on-screen buttons, which caused architects to worry that a generation of students would not understand the limitations of these calculations. They were probably correct to worry, and they should have certainly worried about the economists who had black-boxed assets to the point where they became so “complicated that the authorities could no longer calculate the risks” according to George Soros.

Complexity and black-boxing is not the whole story. The financial intuitions all had a big incentive to understand the simulation, even if it was hard, complex and obscured. The reason they did not understand the complexity is likely to be an equally complex story and some have even speculated the institutions understood the risks, but thought they were too big to fail. One reason not to follow up on the complexity is given in Simulation and its Discontents: “Simulation makes itself easy to love and difficult to doubt.” This is true if the simulation is returning pretty renders, but I imagine it is especially true if the simulation is making you billions. And by not doubting Turkle warns that “it can be hard to remember all that lies beyond simulation, or even acknowledge that everything is not captured in simulation.” Clearly much lay beyond the financial simulations, but they worked exceptionally well for a long time, making it hard not to be “drunk with code” on the success of these simulations.

The global financial crisis is more than a source of unemployment for architects. It should be a warning about our ambivalence towards simulation. That is not to say we should reject simulation, but rather we should, as Sherry Turkle has done, re-examine our relationship to, and dependence upon simulation. The concerns of architects at MIT in the 1980’s are still true today and the tension between understanding, control and seduction is present.

Do relationships matter?

posted by on 2010.03.16, under Programming, Theory

Recently I have been producing parametric models for Antoni Gaudí’s Sagrada Família; in Excel. When I agreed to use Excel to produce the models, I signed on certain I would fail, such was the unlikeliness of Excel succeeding in producing parametric architecture. While I cannot say much about the project, I should say that we were only using Excel for research purposes and that the design of the Sagrada Família remains one of the worlds most technologically advanced architectural projects. Using Excel drove me pretty close to the wall, particularly at 2am on a Friday as I got the model ready for a deadline and was trying to figure out a formula for a circle intersecting a plane in three dimensions. After two weeks on Excel I am not a convert, but I have begun to re-evaluate the worth of the more technologically advanced tools.

One of the curiosities of Excel is that cell relationships are hidden. A cell displays data and the only way to see relationships is to click on the data and view the formula. This is the inverse of graph based parametric modelling tools like Grasshopper and GC, which graphically represent the relationship between nodes but hide the data – in Grasshopper you need to hover over each node to see the enclosed data. Both approaches achieve a similar result, which got me thinking about why architects use the graph based approach while Excel still uses the spreadsheet based approach.

I am not the first person to consider this. In 1997, Spreadsheet 2000 competed against Excel with a graph based spreadsheet (shown above), which looks suspiciously similar to Grasshopper, complete with Bezier curves. Incredibly Spreadsheet 2000 was itself created with a graph based programming tool, Prograph, by Steve Wilson who went on to become the vice president of systems at Oracle, where he still probably maps out systems using graphs. This must have all seemed pretty advanced in 1997, it still looks advanced today, yet Spreadsheet 2000 failed before reaching the year 2000.

There does not seem to be any analysis on why Spreadsheet 2000 failed, so I am going to speculate: relationships don’t matter. The problem Spreadsheet 2000 was trying to solve was the invisibility of relationships in spreadsheets (Wilson talks about the aims of Spreadsheet 2000 here). The solution was to use a directed graph that exposed the relationships between cells. The graph is successful in doing this, although its verbosity makes it inefficient compared to a normal spreadsheet. For example the relationship between the top right table and the bottom middle table is inversion. Using a graph this takes up a significant amount of interface real-estate – two lines and an intermediate node depicting 1/x – it could have just as easily been communicated by adding a column to the top right data headed ‘Inverse’. The inefficiency of the graph increases with complexity since more nodes make it more difficult to interpret individual relationships from the spaghetti of code.

By exposing the relationships, Spreadsheet 2000 aimed to reduce errors. This is not the case. There is no correlation between knowing the relationships between cells and the number of errors. Stephen Powell’s “A Critical Review of the Literature on Spreadsheet Errors,” references a study where one group of participants were given a spreadsheet on paper so they could not see the cell relationships, another group were given an electronic copy so they could see the formula, and both groups identified a similar number of errors in the spreadsheet, 50%.* Anecdotally I agree with this; I have never stared at the Grasshopper graph and gone ‘there is my mistake,’ I do however see errors in the 3d model and then find myself working back through the graph, hovering over each node to see what the data inside looks like.

Spreadsheet 2000′s failure seems to be a common occurrence for visual programming paradigms. It is only in parametric architecture that I have really seen graph based tools like Grasshopper and GC become so widely adopted. I am unsure of why this is the case. After using Excel I feel there is still room to improve on these paradigms, particularly the emphasis they place on relationships, which are often only needed at the time of construction. Despite this, unless you are Gaudí, I wont be giving up my graph based representations again.


Download Spreadsheet 2000 here

* Similar research has been done by the European Spreadsheet Risks Interest Group, a group that gives me considerable comfort knowing that someone is looking out for our accountants and the risks they face.

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